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This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with 
unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an 
uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first 
equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for 
multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts 
of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric 
characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium 
payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information 
certification. 
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As is now well known in the literature on cheap talk games (i.e., games with costless,
non-binding, and unmediated communication), repeated communication generally allows
to reach outcomes that cannot be implemented with unilateral or single-period communi-
cation, even if only one player is privately informed (see Aumann and Hart, 2003, Forges,
1984, 1990a, Krishna and Morgan, 2004, and Simon, 2002). In this paper we study this fea-
ture in \sender-receiver" communication games with partially veriable types, also called
persuasion games, in which the informed player (the expert, or \sender") has the abil-
ity to voluntarily certify partial or full information to the uninformed decisionmaker (the
\receiver"). We characterize the set of all Nash equilibrium payos achievable with un-
mediated communication, by allowing players to talk for many periods. At each stage of
this communication phase, the sender can certify part of his information.
This possibility of certifying information, in addition to make cheap talk claims, is jus-
tied by many concrete interactive decision situations. For example, players may present
physical proofs such as documents, observable characteristics of a product, endowments
or costs. Alternatively, in economic or legal interactions there may be labels, penalties
for perjury, false advertising and warranty violations, or accounting principles that allow
agents to submit substantive evidence of their information. Interesting phenomena similar
to those obtained in the cheap talk case arise in games with strategic information certi-
cation. We show that several bilateral communication stages and delayed information
certication allow to convey substantive information and lead to equilibrium outcomes
that are not achievable when only one signalling stage is permitted. A leading example is
analyzed in Section 2.
Our study is closely related to Aumann and Hart (2003) who characterized Nash
equilibrium payos of long cheap talk games, i.e., the subset of communication equilibrium
payos (Forges, 1986, 1990b; Myerson, 1982, 1986) that use only plain conversation. A
communication equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of an extension of the game allowing the
players to communicate for several periods, with the help of a mediator, before they make
their decisions. Here, we characterize the analog of that subset for certication equilibria
(Forges and Koessler, 2005). A certication equilibrium is dened as a communication
equilibrium, except that each player can also transmit reports from a type-dependent set,
i.e., can send certied information into the communication system.
Our general model, presented in Section 3, is a one-side incomplete information game
with an expert (the informed player) and a decision maker (the uninformed player). A
common prior probability distribution rst selects the expert's type in a nite set. The
2decision maker chooses his action without observing the expert's type. However, before
the action phase, but after the expert learns his type, the players are able to directly
communicate with each other. The payo of each player only depends on the expert's type
and on the decision maker's action. Communication is assumed strategic, non-binding (no
commitment and no contract are allowed), payo-irrelevant, and unmediated. In addition,
players are not able to observe private payo-irrelevant signals (\private sunspots") and
there is no extraneous noise in communication, which thus takes place \face-to-face".
However, randomized strategies are allowed in both the communication and action phases.
Contrary to usual cheap talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Ben-Porath, 2003;
Gerardi, 2004; Krishna and Morgan, 2004), our communication games allow the set of
messages available to the expert to be type-dependent, which reects the ability to certify
his information. We will assume that the expert has always the opportunity to remain
silent, i.e., to send a meaningless message to the decision maker. Furthermore, to guarantee
that our geometric characterization be sucient for an equilibrium, we will require that
players have access to a rich language and that information is fully certiable. More
precisely, we make the following assumption: for any set of types containing his real type,
the expert has a suciently large set of messages allowing him to certify that his real type
belongs to that set.
In the associated one-shot communication game the expert learns his type and sends
a message to the decision maker, who then chooses an action. Such games are sometimes
called persuasion or disclosure games (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts,
1986; Seidmann and Winter, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, this literature has
always focused on one-shot information revelation with very specic assumptions on play-
ers' preferences, like single-peakedness, strict concavity and monotonicity. Our rst result
(Theorem 1) is a full characterization of Nash equilibrium payos of one-shot communica-
tion games with certiable information. Roughly, equilibrium payo vectors are obtained
by convexifying the graph of the equilibrium payo correspondence of the basic game
without communication (the silent game), by keeping the payo of the informed player
constant and individually rational. Several geometric illustrations involving full, partial
and/or no information revelation are provided.
In a multistage communication game, the talking phase has an arbitrarily large num-
ber of periods. In each communication period both players simultaneously send a message
that depends on the history of play up to that period. The informed player's message
may also depend on his private information. As in Hart (1985) and Aumann and Hart
(2003), our equilibrium characterization makes use of the mathematical concepts of dicon-
vexication and dimartingale. In Theorem 2 we show that the set of equilibrium payos
3of any multistage communication game can be characterized in terms of starting points
of dimartingales converging to the graph of the equilibrium payo correspondence of the
silent game, and staying in an adapted set of individually rational payos for the informed
player during the whole process. Individual rationality must indeed be formulated in a
stage-dependent way in our model. This is the main dierence with Aumann and Hart's
(2003) characterization. Our representation can also be formulated by using the dicon-
vexication operator. However, by contrast to Aumann and Hart (2003), the graph of
the equilibrium payo correspondence of the multistage communication game is not the
diconvexication of a given set.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our leading example.
Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 formulates the geometric characterizations of the
equilibrium payos, illustrates them through examples, and provides a more detailed com-
parison with Aumann and Hart (2003). Formal proofs of Theorem 1 (one-shot, unilateral
persuasion) and Theorem 2 (multistage, bilateral persuasion) are provided in Sections 5
and 6, respectively. We discuss extensions of the model in Section 7: mediated persuasion,
unbounded number of talking stages, equilibrium renement, and partial certiability. The
Appendix contains several additional examples.
2 An Example
In this section we study an example which motivates two aspects of our analysis. First,
the example illustrates how by certifying their information players can reach equilibrium
outcomes that cannot be achieved by any communication system with non-certiable in-
formation. Second, the example shows that delayed information certication and multiple
rounds of bilateral communication may be required to achieve some equilibrium payos,
even if only one player has substantive information.
Consider two players, player 1 (the expert) and player 2 (the decisionmaker), who are
playing a strategic form game which depends on the true state of Nature, k1 or k2, each
of probability 1/2 (see Figure 1 on the following page). Player 1 knows the true state of
Nature but player 2 does not know the actual game being played. Player 2 must choose
action j1, j2, j3, j4 or j5, and player 1 has no choice. The expected payo of player 2, as a
function of his action and his belief p 2 [0;1] about state k1, is represented by Figure 2 on
the next page (the thick lines denote his best-reply payo).
Without communication possibilities (in the \silent game"), the only equilibrium payo
is (0;7) since action j3 yields the best expected payo for player 2 given his prior belief
p = 1=2. If, before player 2's decision, the players are able to talk to each other, but
4j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
k1 5;0 3;4 0;7 4;9 2;10
k2 1;10 3;9 0;7 5;4 6;0



















Figure 2: Player 2's expected payos (thin lines) and best-reply expected payos (thick
lines) in the introductory example.
no information can be certied concerning the true state of Nature then, whatever the
communication possibilities, the unique equilibrium payo remains (0;7). Information
transmission is not possible here because if player 2 chooses his action conditionally on
the messages sent by player 1 then, whatever the true state of Nature, player 1 has always
an incentive to use the messages he should have sent at the other state. In other words,
information which is transmitted to player 2 is never credible, even if in every state it is to
the advantage of both players that player 1 tells the truth to player 2, and that the latter
believes him. Notice that allowing unboundedly long communication, or even adding a
mediator, cannot help here: one can check that the unique communication equilibrium
outcome is the equilibrium j3 of the silent game.
Assume now that player 1 can voluntarily certify his information concerning the real
state of Nature. That is, his informational reports are assumed truthful (the making
5of false statements is prohibited), but he may withhold his information since he is not
required to make positive disclosures. Assume rst that player 1 can only send a single
message and that player 2 cannot send any message. More precisely, assume that player 1
can choose between two types of reports: either he certies his information (he sends
message m = c1 if the real state is k1 and message m = c2 if the real state is k2), or he
certies no information (he sends message m = m which is available whatever the true
state). It is easy to see that full revelation of information is now an equilibrium, denoted
by FRE: player 2 chooses action j5 if player 1 reveals that the true state is k1, he chooses
j1 if player 1 reveals that the true state is k2, and chooses j3 if player 1 reveals nothing. In
such a situation, player 1 has no incentive not to reveal his information because his payo
would be zero instead of 2 in state k1 and 1 in state k2. Obviously, player 2 also behaves
rationally because he chooses the best action for him in each state of Nature.
As in usual cheap talk games, the non-revealing outcome is also an equilibrium, denoted
by NRE, since player 2 can always ignore what player 1 says and choose action j3.1
The two equilibrium outcomes described above are not the only equilibrium outcomes
of the one-shot communication game with certiable information. Indeed, if we allow
player 1 to randomize, then there are two other partially revealing equilibria. One of them
is better for player 1 than any of the previous pure strategy equilibria since it gives him a
payo of 2 whatever his type. In this equilibrium, denoted by PRE1, player 1 certies his
type (i.e., sends message c1) with probability 1/3 and remains silent (i.e., sends message
m) with probability 2/3 in k1, and he always remain silent in state k2. Player 2's posterior




2=6+1=2 = 2=5 and Pr(k1 j c1) = 1, so he plays
action j5 when he receives message c1 and is indierent between j2 and j3 when he receives
message m. If he plays j2 with probability 2=3 and j3 with probability 1=3 after m, and if
he plays j1 after the o-equilibrium message c2 then player 1 has no incentive to deviate:
in k1 he gets a payo of 2 if he sends message c1 and also (2=3)  3 + (1=3)  0 = 2 if he
sends message m, so he is indierent between the two messages; in k2 he gets a payo of 1
if he sends message c2 and (2=3)  3 + (1=3) 0 = 2 if he sends message m, so he strictly
prefers to send message m.
In the second partially revealing equilibrium with randomized certication, denoted by
PRE2, player 1 always remains silent in state k1; he certies his type with probability 1/3
and remains silent with probability 2/3 in k2. Player 2's posterior beliefs are Pr(k1 j m) =
3=5 and Pr(k1 j c2) = 0, so he plays action j1 when he receives message c2 and is indierent
1However, notice that contrary to the fully revealing equilibrium, the non-revealing equilibrium is based
on irrational choices o the equilibrium path since player 2 should not choose action j3 when player 1
reveals him the true state of Nature (NRE is not subgame perfect). Restrictions to credible moves o the
equilibrium path are investigated in Subsection 7.3.
6between j3 and j4 when he receives message m. If he plays j3 with probability 4=5 and j4
with probability 1=5 after message m, and if he plays j3 after the o-equilibrium message
c1 then it can be checked as before that player 1 has no incentive to deviate.2
Now, we show that if players are able to talk to each other during several bilateral
communication rounds and to delay information certication, then player 1 can reach even
a higher equilibrium payo of 3 whatever his type. This equilibrium can be achieved in
three communication stages. In the rst two communication stages there is no information
certication, and in the last communication stage player 1 will certify his information to
player 2 conditionally on what both players said in the previous communication stages.
In the rst communication stage player 1 partially reveals (without certifying) his
information by using a random communication strategy which transmits the correct in-
formation with probability 3/4 so as to leave some doubt in player 2's mind. That is,
he sends message m = a with probability 3/4 if the real state is k1 and with probability
1/4 if the real state if k2. Symmetrically, he sends message m = b with probability 3/4 if
the real state is k2 and with probability 1/4 if the real state if k1 (the labeling of these
two messages is irrelevant but both messages a and b are cheap talk messages: they must
be available to player 1 whatever his type). From Bayes' rule, player 2 will believe state
k1 with probability 3/4 if he receives message a and with probability 1=4 if he receives
message b. Hence, substantive but only partial information is conveyed, without any in-
formation certication. Communication cannot stop now since, as seen before, player 1
would have an incentive to deviate by always sending message a at k1 and message b at
k2. Assume that player 2 chooses action j2 whenever he receives message b. This choice is
rational given his beliefs. Otherwise, when message a is sent, they agree on a jointly con-
trolled 1
2   1
2 lottery to reach the following compromise (this second communication stage
conveys no substantive information, i.e., no information about the fundamentals of the
game).3 If head (H) occurs, then communication stops and thus player 1 chooses action
j4. On the contrary, if tail (T) occurs, then player 1 certies his information in the last
communication stage (he sends message ck if the real state is k). Then, player 2 chooses
action j5 if c1 is sent and action j1 if c2 is sent. Player 1 has no incentive to deviate if, for
example, player 2 chooses action j3 when player 1 deviates in the last communication stage
2Notice that contrary to the previous partially revealing equilibrium, this equilibrium is based on irra-
tional choices o the equilibrium path since player 2 should not choose action j3 when player 1 reveals him
the true state of Nature (PRE2 is not subgame perfect). Again, see Subsection 7.3 for Nash equilibrium
renements.
3A jointly controlled lottery is a mechanism that generates a uniform probability distribution on any
nite set from private random communication strategies so that a unilateral deviation does not change the




2 lottery can be generated as follows: each player chooses a
message in fa;bg at random, both players announce their choices simultaneously and the outcome is head
(H) if the messages coincide and tail (T) otherwise.
7by remaining silent. The whole communication and decision process in this equilibrium is
summarized by Figure 3 (where \JCL" stands for \jointly controlled lottery"). Player 2's
expected payo is 133

























































































Figure 3: An equilibrium communication and decision tree for the introductory example.
In Section 4 we will provide geometric characterizations of all possible equilibrium
payos of communication games with certiable information. For example, the previous
fully revealing equilibrium (FRE) and the two partially revealing equilibria (PRE1 and
PRE2) of the unilateral persuasion game are simply characterized by the points FRE,
PRE1 and PRE2 in Figure 7 on page 18. The non-existence of informative equilibrium
in cheap talk games (of bounded length) in which information is not certiable is simply
characterized by the fact that the solid lines in Figure 7 never intercept. The geometric
characterization of the equilibrium described above requiring information certication as
well as multiple and bilateral communication stages is slightly more complex, and will be
illustrated in Subsection 4.4.
83 Model
We consider two players: player 1 (the informed player, or expert) and player 2 (the
uninformed decisionmaker (DM)). J (jJj  2) is the nite action set of player 2 (player 1
has no action). K (jKj  2) is the nite set of states (or types of player 1), with a common
prior probability distribution p = (p1;:::;pk;:::;pK) 2 (K). Let supp[p]  fk 2 K :
pk > 0g.4 When player 2 chooses action j 2 J and the state is k 2 K, the payos to
player 1 and player 2 are Ak(j) and Bk(j), respectively.
3.1 Silent Game
The silent game, denoted by  (p), consists of two phases. In the information phase a
state k 2 K is picked at random according to the probability distribution p. Player 1
is perfectly informed about the true state k, while player 2 is not. In the action phase,
player 2 chooses an action j 2 J. Player 1 and player 2 receive payos Ak(j) and Bk(j),
respectively.
A strategy of player 2 in the silent game  (p) is a mixed action y 2 (J). We
extend payo functions linearly to mixed actions: Ak(y) =
P
j2J y(j)Ak(j) and Bk(y) =
P
j2J y(j)Bk(j). The set of (Bayesian) Nash equilibria of the silent game  (p) is the
set of optimal mixed actions for player 2 in the silent game  (p). It is called the set of
non-revealing equilibrium outcomes at p, and is denoted by:















pk Bk(j); 8 j 2 J
)
:
Remark 1 A pure action is always sucient to maximize the decisionmaker's payo. So,
for all j, j0 2 supp[Y (p)] and y 2 (J) we have pB(j) = pB(j0)  pB(y). However, mixed
actions will become useful once the action phase will be preceded by communication: (i)
on the equilibrium path, to make player 1 indierent between several messages, and (ii)
o the equilibrium path, to punish player 1.
The resulting equilibrium payos are the (K + 1)-dimensional vectors (a;), where
a = (a1;:::;aK), ak = Ak(y) is the payo of player 1 of type k, which is only relevant
if k 2 supp[p], and the scalar  = pB(y) is player 2's expected payo (expectation over
k). Let E(p) be the set of equilibrium payos of  (p), also called the set of non-revealing
4We could assume w.l.o.g. that p
k > 0 for all k 2 K but in order to capture the games corresponding
to an updating of the prior over K, we allow p
k = 0 for some k's.
9equilibrium payos at p.5 That is,
E(p)  f(a;) 2 RK  R : 9 y 2 Y (p); ak = Ak(y) 8 k 2 supp[p];  = pB(y)g:
3.2 Unilateral Persuasion Game
Here, we consider only direct (unmediated and noiseless) and unilateral communication,
from player 1 to player 2. The set of messages available to player 1 is state-dependent and
is denoted by M(k) when his type is k. Let M1 =
S
k2K M(k) be the set of all messages
that player 1 could send. The set
T
k2K M(k) is the set of all cheap talk messages available
to player 1, i.e., the set of all messages that player 1 can send whatever his type.
We assume that the set of cheap talk messages available to player 1 is nonempty. That
is, there exists m 2 M1 such that M 1(m) = K. This \right to remain silent" assumption
will be needed for the \only if" part (from equilibrium to dimartingale) of Theorems 1
and 2. For the \if" part (from dimartingale to equilibrium), we will further assume that
the message space and certiability possibilities of the sender are suciently rich. That is,
whatever his type k, and for each event L  K containing k, player 1 can choose among a
suciently large set of messages certifying that his real type is in L. Formally, we assume
that
jfm 2 M1 : M 1(m) = Lgj  jLj + 1; for all L  K:
Notice that this rich language and certiability assumption implies the previous assump-
tion that the set
T
k2K M(k) is nonempty (simply take L = K). As we shall illustrate in
Subsection 7.4, assuming full certiability only for singleton events L = fkg would not be
sucient for the \if" part of the theorems.
The signalling game determined by   and p, denoted by  S(p), is obtained by adding a
one-shot talking phase to the silent game  (p) before the action phase but after the infor-
mation phase. Therefore, this game corresponds to a standard persuasion game (Milgrom,
1981; Shin, 1994; Seidmann and Winter, 1997) and has three phases (see Figure 4).
Information phase
Expert learns k 2 K
Talking phase
Expert sends message m1 2 M(k)
Action phase
DM chooses action j 2 J
Figure 4: Unilateral persuasion (signalling) game  S(p).
5Our denition diers from Aumann and Hart's (2003) denition when the probability of some types
vanishes. See Subsection 4.2 for a more detailed comparison.
10The extensive form representation of the unilateral persuasion game with only two
types, two cheap talk messages and one certicate for each type (M(k) = fa;b;ckg, k =








































Figure 5: Extensive form of the unilateral persuasion game  S(p) with two types, two
cheap talk messages and one certicate for each type (M(k) = fa;b;ckg, k = k1;k2).
A strategy for player 1 in the unilateral persuasion game is a prole  = (k)k2K,
with k 2 (M(k)) for all k. A strategy for player 2 is a function  : M 1 ! (J). A
pair of strategies (;) generates expected payos (a1
;;:::;aK
;) and ; for player 1 and










Let ES(p) be the set of Nash equilibrium payos of  S(p).
3.3 Multistage, Bilateral Persuasion Game
We consider an arbitrarily large but nite number n  1 of communication rounds. In
each communication round t = 1;:::;n each player can directly send a message to the
other. As in the unilateral persuasion game, the set of messages available to player 1 is
denoted by M(k) when his type is k, M1 =
S
k2K M(k) is the set of all messages that
player 1 could send, and
T
k2K M(k) 6= ; is the set of all cheap talk messages available to
11player 1. The set of messages available to player 2 is denoted by M 2, with jM2j  2.
As in the unilateral persuasion game we assume that jfm 2 M 1 : M 1(m) = Lgj 
jLj+1 for all L  K. However, notice that in the multistage communication game it would
be sucient to have two cheap talk messages and that a combination of several certicates
allows to certify any event L  K.6 The above specic assumption on the richness of the
message space is only for convenience.
The bilateral persuasion game with n communication stages, determined by   and p, is
denoted by  n(p). It is obtained by adding a talking phase with n bilateral communication
rounds to the silent game  (p) before the action phase but after the information phase (see
Figure 6). At each period t = 1;:::;n of the talking phase, type k 2 K of player 1 sends
a message m1
t 2 M(k) to player 2, and player 2 sends a message m2
t 2 M2 to player 1
(perfect monitoring). Messages are sent simultaneously.
Information phase
Expert learns k 2 K
Talking phase (n  1 rounds)
Expert and DM send (m1
t;m2
t) 2 M(k)  M2
(t = 1;:::n)
Action phase
DM chooses j 2 J
Figure 6: n-Stage bilateral persuasion game  n(p).





t) 2 (M1  M2)
t:
The set of all t-period histories is denoted by Mt = (M1  M2)
t. A strategy7  of player 1
in the n-period communication game  n(p) consists of a sequence of functions 1;:::;n,
where t = (1
t;:::;K
t ) and k
t : Mt 1 ! (M(k)) for k 2 K and t = 1;:::;n. A
strategy  of player 2 consists of a sequence of functions 1;:::;n, and a function n+1,
where t : Mt 1 ! (M2) for t = 1;:::;n, and n+1 : Mn ! (J).
A pair of strategies (;) generates expected payos a; = (a1
;;:::;aK
;) and ;
for player 1 and player 2, respectively. The set of (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the
persuasion game  n(p) is denoted by En(p). Notice that ES(p)  En(p)  En+1(p) for all
n  1. Let EB(p) =
S
n1 En(p) be the set of Nash equilibrium payos of all multistage,
bilateral persuasion games determined by   and p.
6That is, it would be sucient to assume that j
T
k2K M(k)j  2, and 8 k, 8 k




7We focus on nite games with perfect recall. Hence, by Kuhn's (1953) theorem behavioral strategies
are without loss of generality.
124 Characterization of Equilibrium Payos ES(p) and EB(p)
4.1 Statement of the Results
Let H be the graph of the non-revealing equilibrium payo correspondence, namely
H = grE  f(a;;p) 2 RK  R  (K) : (a;) 2 E(p)g;
where E(p) has been dened in Subsection 3.1. Notice that the set E(p) is convex for all
p. In other words, H is convex in (a;) when p is kept constant. However, H need not be
convex in (;p) when a is kept constant.
For any (nonempty) set of types L  K, let
INTIRL  fa 2 RK : 9 y 2 (J); ak  Ak(y) 8 k 2 Lg;
be the set of payos that are interim individually rational for player 1 when we restrict
the individual rationality constraint to a subset L of player 1's set of types. Remark that
INTIRL  INTIRL0 whenever L0  L. Let I be the graph of the payos that are interim
individually rational for player 1 in the silent game  (p):
I  f(a;;p) 2 RK  R  (K) : a 2 INTIRsupp[p]g:
As H, I is convex in (a;) when p is kept constant, but not in p when a is kept con-
stant.8 Obviously, every non-revealing equilibrium payo is interim individually rational
for player 1 so that H  I.
Let
H1  conva(H) \ I;
be the set of expected payos obtained from H by convexifying in (;p) when the payo
of player 1, a, is kept constant and is interim individually rational for player 1. Even if H
is included in I, payos in conva(H) need not be interim individually rational for player 1,
while this is clearly a necessary equilibrium condition. We thus have to require individual
rationality explicitly in the denition of H1.9 It turns out that this requirement is also
sucient for the equilibrium characterization of the unilateral persuasion game.
Theorem 1 (Unilateral Persuasion) The set ES(p) of Nash equilibrium payos of the
8For instance, in Example 1 in the appendix, ((0;0);;p) 2 I for p 2 f0;1g but not for p 2 (0;1).
9The restriction to supp[p] for individual rationality is irrelevant for the next theorem, but will be
important in the multistage game.
13unilateral persuasion game  S(p) coincides with the p-section of H1:
ES(p) = H1(p)  f(a;) 2 RK  R : (a;;p) 2 H1g:
In addition, any Nash equilibrium payo of  S(p) can be obtained with at most K + 1
messages.
Proof. See Section 5.
From the proof of the \if" part of the theorem (the construction of the sender's strat-
egy), the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1 Let pk > 0 for all k 2 K. Every equilibrium of the unilateral persuasion
game  S(p) is outcome equivalent (i.e., it induces the same probability distribution over
player 2's decision conditionally on k) to a \canonical" equilibrium (;) with the following
property:
For all m 2 M1, if k(m) > 0 for some k 2 K, then k0
(m) > 0 for all k0 2 M 1(m):
In particular, if a cheap talk message m 2
T
k2K M(k) is sent with strictly positive
probability by player 1, then all types of player 1 send this message with strictly posi-
tive probability. More generally, the proposition says that in equilibrium we can assume
without loss of generality that if player 2's posterior about a certain type k of player 1 is
null after some message m sent with strictly positive probability, then k = 2 M  1(m), i.e.,
message m certies that k is not realized. In particular, all types have strictly positive
posterior probability after a cheap talk message (sent with strictly positive probability in
equilibrium). Without using the geometric characterization of Theorem 1, the intuition
of the proposition is as follows. Assume that type k0 does not send a message m but
could have sent it (i.e., m 2 M(k0)). Then, the types who send message m could have
sent another message instead of m that certies that k0 is not realized, without changing
player 2's posteriors and so without changing the equilibrium outcome.
To get the equilibrium payos for persuasion games with several bilateral communica-
tion rounds, we rst consider the payos obtained as convex combinations of elements in H1
with p xed which are interim individually rational for player 1: H
1 = convp(H1)\I. Since
H1  I and I is convex in (a;) when p is xed, convp(H1)  I so that H
1 = convp(H1).
We then proceed with H
1 as we did above with H, namely convexifying in (p;) keeping
a constant and interim individually rational. This yields H3=2 = conva(H
1) \ I. Next, by
convexifying in (a;) at p xed, we get H2 = convp(H3=2) = convp(H3=2)\I. The p-section
14of the set H2 is the set of equilibrium payos of persuasion games with four communica-
tion rounds: a jointly controlled lottery, a step of signalling, a second jointly controlled
lottery, and a second step of signalling. Next, let H3 be the set obtained from H2 by
convexifying in (;p) when player 1's payo a is xed, and then by convexifying in (a;)
when player 2's belief p is xed, with again the restriction that the payo of player 1 is
interim individually rational for the types with a strictly positive posterior. The p-section
of the set H3 is the set of equilibrium payos of persuasion games with six communication
rounds. The set Hn, n  2, thus corresponds to 2n stages of \canonical" communica-
tion, in which signalling and jointly controlled lotteries alternate. We introduce a slight
disymmetry in the denition of H1, which captures a single stage of signalling for player 1.
The limit of the increasing sequence H1, H2, ... constructed in this way is denoted by
di-co IR(H) 
S
l1 Hl to recall the process of diconvexication used in the construction.
Observe that, since I is not a di-convex set, di-co IR(H) need not be di-convex (see the
comparison with Aumann and Hart, 2003 in the next subsection). Points in di-co IR(H)
correspond to all equilibrium payos of bilateral persuasion games of bounded length. In
the next theorem, the set di-co IR(H) is expressed more elegantly as the set of starting
points of particular martingales that converge to H.
Theorem 2 (Multistage, Bilateral Persuasion) The set EB(p) of all Nash equilib-
rium payos from bilateral persuasion games  n(p), n  1, coincides with the p-section of
di-co IR(H):
EB(p) = HB(p)  f(a;) 2 RK  R : (a;;p) 2 di-co IR(H)g:
Equivalently, (a;) 2 EB(p) if and only if there exists a martingale z = (z0;z1;:::;zN),
with zs = (as;s;ps) 2 I for all s = 0;1;:::;N, satisfying the following properties:
(D1) z0 = (a;;p). That is, the starting point (and expectation) of the martingale is
the Nash equilibrium payo under consideration.
(D2) zN 2 H. That is, the martingale converges to the set of non-revealing equilibrium
payos: (aN;N) 2 E(pN).
(D3) as+1 = as for all even s and ps+1 = ps for all odd s. That is, the martingale is
a dimartingale.10
Proof. See Section 6.
10All statements involving random variables should be understood to hold for all states occurring with
strictly positive probability.
15Remark 2 Requiring aN 2 INTIRK guarantees as 2 INTIRsupp[ps] for all s, but is
a much too strong condition: it is easy to construct an example with an equilibrium
payo (a;) 2 EB(p) but aN = 2 INTIRK, K 6= supp[pN]. On the other hand, requiring
a0 2 INTIRK is not sucient. Indeed, one can easily construct a dimartingale with
a0 2 INTIRK, (aN;N;pN) 2 H, but (a;) = 2 EB(p) (as = 2 INTIRsupp[ps] for some
history at s). More generally, the condition zs 2 I is redundant at some stages s but
not at all of them. For instance, if s is even, as+1 = as, as 2 INTIRsupp[ps], and the
fact that supp[ps+1]  supp[ps] imply as+1 2 INTIRsupp[ps+1]. But the converse is not
true: one may have as+1 2 INTIRsupp[ps+1] without having as = as+1 2 INTIRsupp[ps].
If s is odd, ps+1 = ps, as+1 2 INTIRsupp[ps+1] and the martingale property imply that
as 2 INTIRsupp[ps]. Again, the converse is not true. These properties explain why, starting
from the end of the process in order to construct di-co IR(H), one had to intercept with I
only when convexifying at a xed.
Remark 3 If there exists a worst outcome for player 1 (i.e., an action jw 2 J such that
Ak(jw)  Ak(j) for all k 2 K and j 2 J), then the individual rationality conditions are
automatically satised.
4.2 Comparison with Aumann and Hart (2003)
When some coordinates of p vanish, Aumann and Hart (2003) consider the modied equi-
librium payos E+(p) of the silent game  (p), which is the same as E(p) except that when
the probability of one of player 1's type vanishes, then the corresponding type of player 1
can only get more than his equilibrium payo. That is, the set of modied non-revealing
equilibrium payos is the set of all payos (a;) such that there exits an equilibrium
y 2 Y (p) of the silent game  (p) satisfying
(i) ak  Ak(y), for all k 2 K;




The graph of the modied non-revealing equilibrium payo correspondence is
G  grE+  f(a;;p) 2 RK  R  (K) : (a;) 2 E+(p)g:
Here, we consider the more natural set of non-revealing equilibrium payos, E(p), in
which it is understood that the types of player 1 which have probability zero can get any
16payo (only conditions (ii) and (iii) above must be satised) Clearly, E +(p)  E(p) and if
p has full support, both sets coincide.
Let di-co(G) be the smallest set which contains G and is convex in (a;) (respectively
(;p)) when p (respectively a) is xed. Aumann and Hart (2003) characterize the set of
all equilibrium payos achieved with nitely many stages of bilateral cheap talk as the p-
section of di-co(G). This extremely elegant characterization relies on the identication of
the modied set of non-revealing equilibrium payos E+(p) for every non interior p, which
ensures that all equilibrium conditions of player 1 can be written as equalities, namely
captured by a dimartingale property. In this framework, player 1's expected payo remains
fully interim individually rational (in INTIRK) all along the communication process.
Our starting set H corresponds to the non-modied graph of the non-revealing equilib-
rium payo correspondence in the sense that we do not impose any condition on player 1's
payo when his type has zero probability. The geometric properties of our nal graph
of equilibrium payos are not so transparent since, as observed above, di-co IR(H) is not
necessarily convex in (;p) when a is xed. Obviously, this set is convex in (a;) when
p is xed since the players can perform jointly controlled lotteries. If player 1 can send
certicates in addition to cheap talk messages, some states of nature may be eliminated
forever. Player 1's individual rationality conditions must thus be expressed relatively to
the remaining possible states. These individual rationality conditions are more important
than in the case of pure cheap talk because player 2 can punish player 1 if he does not
send a suciently precise message.
4.3 Illustration of Theorem 1 (Unilateral Persuasion)
For the introductory example, the graph of the modied non-revealing equilibrium payo
correspondence, G = grE+, is represented on the (a1;a2)-coordinates by solid lines in Fig-
ure 7 on the next page. The graph of the non-revealing equilibrium payo correspondence,
H = grE, is represented in the same gure by the solid and dashed lines. The sets G and
H are also described in the second and third columns of Table 1 on page 20. Since all
points at the north-east of (0;0) are interim individually rational for player 1, convexi-
fying the set H by keeping a constant and interim individually rational yields three new
points at p = 1=2: FRE, PRE1 and PRE2, which are exactly the three Nash equilibrium
payos found in Section 2, in addition to the non-revealing equilibrium (NRE). Indeed,
each of these points corresponds to two non-revealing equilibrium payos, at two dierent
p's forming an interval that includes p = 1=2, giving the same payo to player 1. Notice
that, for example, the point PRE3 is not an equilibrium payo for p = 1=2 because 1/2





























Figure 7: Modied non-revealing equilibrium payos (solid lines) and interim individually
rational non-revealing equilibrium payos (solid and dashed lines) of the expert in the
introductory example.
4.4 Illustration of Theorem 2 (Multistage, Bilateral Persuasion)
The dimartingale corresponding to the equilibrium with three talking stages of the in-
troductory example (see Figure 3 on page 8) is represented by Figure 8 on the following
page, where the two numbers in parentheses ((1) and (2)) correspond to non-revealing
equilibrium payos ensuring the dimartingale property (D3) of Theorem 2. It leads to the
point j2 at p = 1=2 in Figure 7, which is not achievable at p = 1=2 with only one step of
diconvexication.
Adding a jointly controlled lottery before a signalling stage allows a convexication by
keeping p xed. This leads to the graph H
1 = convp(H1) described on the a-coordinates
in the fourth column of Table 1. For example, adding a jointly controlled lottery before
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;p) = ((3;3); 133
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Figure 8: Dimartingale/diconvexication corresponding to the equilibrium with three talk-
ing stages in the introductory example.
the unilateral persuasion game, [j3;FRE,PRE1,PRE2]. Adding a second signalling stage
allows a second convexication by keeping a xed. One can check that this does not
yield new equilibrium payos, except for p 2 (2=5;3=5). Indeed, for p 2 (2=5;3=5) one can
combine the sets H
1(p0) = [j2;PRE2;FRE], p0 2 (1=5;2=5), and H
1(p00) = [j4;PRE3,FRE],
p00 2 (3=5;4=5), which leads to the payos in the triangle [j2;PRE1,FRE], which were not
achievable at p 2 (2=5;3=5) with only 2 communication stages. Hence, for p 2 (2=5;3=5),
H2(p) = H
1(p)[[j2;PRE1,FRE] = [j3;PRE2;j2;FRE]. It is easy to verify that one cannot
get new points after two steps of diconvexication in both directions, so H2 = Hn for all
n  2.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
We assume w.l.o.g. that supp[p] = K, so that ES(p) can be characterized equivalently as
the p-section of conva(H) \ f(a;;p) 2 RK  R  (K) : a 2 INTIRKg.
19p G H H
1 = convp(H1) H2
0 (a1  5;1) (a1;1)  
(0; 1
5) j1 j1 [j1;PRE2] 
1
5 [j1;j2] [j1;j2] [j1;j2;PRE2] 
(1
5; 2
5) j2 j2 [j2;PRE2;FRE] 
2
5 [j2;j3] [j2;j3] [j2;PRE2;j3;FRE] 
(2
5; 3
5) j3 j3 [j3;FRE,PRE1,PRE2] [j3;PRE2;j2;FRE]
3
5 [j3;j4] [j3;j4] [j3;j4;FRE] 
(3
5; 4
5) j4 j4 [j4;PRE3,FRE] 
4
5 [j4;j5] [j4;j5] [j4;j5;FRE] 
(4
5;1) j5 j5 [j5;FRE] 
1 (2;a2  6) (2;a2)  
Table 1: Diconvexication of the non-revealing equilibrium payos of the introductory
example. \" means \as in the previous column".
5.1 From equilibrium to constrained convexication: ES(p)  H1(p)
Let (;) be any Nash equilibrium of the unilateral persuasion game  S(p), where pk > 0
for all k 2 K, and let (a;) 2 ES(p) be the associated equilibrium payos. We must show
that (a;;p) is in H1, i.e., (a;;p) can be obtained as a convex combination of points
in H = grE by keeping a constant and interim individually rational (a 2 INTIRK). Let
P = P;;p be the probability distribution on 
 = K  M1  J generated by players'





is the (ex ante) probability that player 1 sends message m 2 M 1. Let M = fm 2 M1 :
P(m) > 0g. For all m 2 M, let
pk
















for all k 2 K and  =
P





So, to show that (a;;p) is a convex combination of points in H be keeping a constant
it suces to show that (a;m;pm) 2 H for all m 2 M, i.e., (a;m) 2 E(pm) for all
m 2 M. Player 2's equilibrium condition implies that (m) 2 Y (pm) for all m 2 M,
so condition (iii) in the denition of E(pm) (see page 16) is satised for all m 2 M.
Player 1's equilibrium condition implies that Ak((m)) = Ak((m0)) whenever k(m) > 0
and k(m0) > 0 (player 1 of type k should be indierent between all messages that he





for all m such that k(m) > 0 (which is equivalent to pk
m > 0 because pk > 0), so condition
(ii) in the denition of E(pm) is also satised for all m 2 M.
Remark 4 Notice that when pk
m = 0 we may have ak < Ak((m)) (because type k cannot
send message m when m = 2 M(k)), so when some coordinates of pm vanish it is possible
that (a;m;pm) = 2 G  grE+, contrary to the case of cheap talk (Aumann and Hart, 2003).
It remains to show that a 2 INTIRK. Consider a message m 2
T
k2K M(k) (which
exists by the \right to remain silent" assumption), and let y = (m) (m may or may not
be a message sent by player 1 with positive probability, so there may be no rationality
condition on y for player 2 as long as no equilibrium renement is introduced). By player 1's
equilibrium condition, for all k 2 K and m such that k(m) > 0 we have ak = Ak((m)) 
Ak(y), which proves that a 2 INTIRK.
5.2 From constrained convexication to equilibrium: H1(p)  ES(p)
We start from (a;;p), a convex combination of points in H by keeping a constant, with
a 2 INTIRK and pk > 0 for all k 2 K, and we construct an equilibrium (;) of the






21with  2 (W) and (a;w;pw) 2 H for all w 2 W. Without loss of generality we assume
that  has full support. In addition, from Carath eodory's theorem we can let jWj  K+1
since the dimension of (;p) 2 R  (K) is equal to K. For all w 2 W, we associate
a set of types supp[pw]  fk 2 K : pk
w > 0g and a message mw 2 M1 with mw 6= mw0
for w 6= w0, and M 1(mw) = supp[pw]. This is possible given our rich language and
certiability assumption.




pk (and k(m) = 0 if m 6= mw for all w 2 W):
Player 2's strategy . Since by assumption (a;w) 2 E(pw), for all w 2 W we can
dene (see condition (ii) and (iii) of E(pw)),










For the other messages m 6= mw, w 2 W, since by denition a 2 INTIRK, we can dene
(m) = y such that ak  Ak(y) for all k 2 K:
Payos. We rst verify that (a;) is the payo generated by the strategy prole (;)
dened just before. Let P = P;;p be the probability distribution on 
 = KM1J gen-
erated by those strategies and the prior, and let E = E;;p be the associated expectation


















By construction, player 1's expected payo when his type is k is given by
E[Ak(j) j k = k] =
X
w2W











the last equality following from the construction of player 2's strategy: Ak((mw)) = ak
22whenever k(mw) > 0 (, pk






































Equilibrium condition for player 2. Next, we verify that  is a best reply for player 2
to player 1's strategy . Since we have dened (mw) 2 Y (pw) for all w 2 W, and since
the messages (mw)w2W are the only messages sent with strictly positive probability by
player 1, it suces to verify that pw is the correct posterior belief of player 2 when he
receives message mw. This is immediately obtained by Bayes's rule given the denition of
the strategy  of player 1:
P[k = k j m = mw] =







Equilibrium condition for player 1. Finally, we verify that k is a best reply for
player 1 of type k to player 2's strategy . Player 1 of type k sends each message mw, w 2
W, satisfying pk
w > 0 (, k(mw) > 0 because pk > 0) with strictly positive probability. By
construction of player 2's strategy we have Ak((mw)) = ak (see the previous paragraph
\payos") for all such messages, so type k is indeed indierent between all these messages.
Next, remark that type k cannot send the other messages mw satisfying pk
w = 0 because
such messages are such that M 1(mw) = supp[pw], with k = 2 supp[pw] (by the denition
of supp[pw] since pk
w = 0), so mw = 2 M(k). Finally, if player 1 sends a message o the
equilibrium path, m 6= mw for all w 2 W (so P(m) = 0), then he gets Ak((m)) = Ak(y) 
ak = Ak((mw)) for k(mw) > 0, so he does not deviate.
6 Proof of Theorem 2
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we assume w.l.o.g. that supp[p] = K.
236.1 From equilibrium to constrained dimartingale: EB(p)  HB(p)
Except for the construction of player 1's sequence of virtual payos and the fact that we
consider martingales that are bounded in length, this part of the proof is similar to the
proof of Hart (1985) and Aumann and Hart (2003). Let (;) be any Nash equilibrium
of the communication game  n(p) for some nite n  1, where pk > 0 for all k 2 K,
with payos a = (a1;:::;aK) 2 RK for player 1 and  2 R for player 2. We construct
a sequence of random variables z = (z0;z1;:::;zN), with N = 2n, satisfying properties
(D1) to (D3) of Theorem 2, the interim individual rationality conditions zs 2 I for all s,
and the martingale property: E[zs+1 j z0;z1;:::;zs] = zs; s = 0;1;:::;N. We work
on the probability space 









 consists in a type for player 1, a nal
communication history, and an action for player 2. All random variables (denoted in bold
letters when there may be a risk of confusion) are dened on 
. Let P = P;;p be the
probability distribution on 
 generated by players' strategies and the prior probability dis-
tribution on player 1's set of types, and let E = E;;p be the corresponding expectation op-
erator. For example, P[k = k] = pk and P[m1
t = m j ht 1 = ht 1;k = k] = k
t (ht 1)(m).
For s = 0;:::;N we construct a new \half-steps" random variable on 
, gs, that
corresponds to every history of talk, plus every history of talk followed by player 1's









t); if s = 2t is even, t = 0;:::;n
(ht;m1
t+1); if s = 2t + 1 is odd, t = 0;:::;n   1:
So, g0 = h0 = ;, gN = g2n = hn, when s is even the last message in gs is from player 2,
and when s is odd the last message in gs is from player 1. We consider this new random
variable in order to have the dimartingale property (D3).
Sequence of posteriors (ps)s=0;1;:::;N. For each k 2 K and s = 0;:::;N, dene
pk
s  P[k = k j gs];
and ps = (pk
s)k2K 2 (K).
Lemma 1 The sequence (pk
s)s=0;:::;N is a (bounded) martingale satisfying
(i) p0 = p;
(ii) ps+1 = ps for all odd s.
24Proof. The martingale property is simply due to the fact that (pk
s)s=0;:::;N is a sequence
of posteriors by conditioning on more and more information (it is adapted to the sequence
of elds (Gs)s=0;:::;N generated by (gs)s=0;:::;N). (i) is immediate: pk
0 = P[k = k j g0] =
P[k = k] = pk. To prove (ii), let s = 2t + 1 be an odd number. For each k 2 K we have
pk
s+1 = P[k = k j gs+1] = P[k = k j ht;m1
t+1;m2
t+1] = P[k = k j ht;m1
t+1] = pk
s;
the last but one equality following from the fact that, conditional on (ht;m1
t+1), m2
t+1
and k are independent.
Sequence of player 2's payo (s)s=0;1;:::;N. For each s = 0;:::;N, dene
s  E[Bk(j) j gs];
and let y = n+1(gN).
Lemma 2 The sequence (s)s=0;:::;N is a (bounded) martingale satisfying




N Bk(y), with y 2 Y (pN).
Proof. The martingale property is due to the fact that (s)s=0;:::;N is a sequence of
conditional expectations of a xed random variable by conditioning on more and more






k2K pkE[Bk(j) j k = k] = . Next, we have

















the last but one equality following from the fact that, conditional on gN, j and k are
independent.11 The equilibrium condition of player 2 implies that y = n+1(gN) 2 Y (pN).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
At this stage, we have constructed (ps)s=0;1;:::;N and (s)s=0;1;:::;N that have all the
properties required by the theorem. It remains to construct an appropriate sequence of
player 1's payos, which is more delicate.
11For the last equality, remember that we have extended B
k linearly to mixed actions.
25Sequence of player 1's vector payo (ak
s)s=0;1;:::;N, k 2 K. A rst denition that
could come to mind for the characterization of the sequence of player 1's payos is to
simply take
E[Ak(j) j gs];
which is always well dened. However, it is not relevant, in general, for type k (except when
s = N). To see this, consider a very simple example with one unilateral communication
period (N = 1), two types of equal probability (K = fk1;k2g, p1 = p2 = 1=2), and
assume that in the rst talking period type k1 sends message m with probability one and
type k2 sends message m0 with probability one. After message m, player 2 chooses action
j1, and after message m0 he chooses action j2. Then, we would have E[Ak(j) j g0] =
(1=2)Ak(j1) + (1=2)Ak(j2), which is not meaningful for any type k.
A more meaningful denition of k's expected payo is
E[Ak(j) j gs;k = k]:
Unfortunately, it is not well dened when P[gs = gs j k = k] = 0, and this can happen
even when P[gs = gs] > 0. This can be seen easily in the previous example, where
E[Ak(j) j g1 = m0;k = k1] is not well dened albeit P[g1 = m0] = 1=2 > 0.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the denition used by Aumann and Hart (2003) does
not work in our setup. Indeed, they dene the (highest) payo that player 1 of type k can
achieve against player 2's strategy  after the history gs as
sup
~ 
E~ ;;p[Ak(j) j gs];
where the supremum is over all strategies ~  of player 1 such that P~ ;;p[gs j k = k] > 0.
But this is not necessarily well dened in our setup even when P[gs = gs] > 0 because a
history gs may contain a message (certicate) that cannot be sent by type k (for example,
g1 = m = 2 M(k)).
Hence, we follow a dierent, and somehow simpler, approach. For each k 2 K, we
construct the sequence of type k's (virtual) payo (ak
s)s=0;1;:::;N as follows. Let ak
s =
ak
s(gs). When P[gs = gs j k = k] > 0, we dene
ak
s(gs) = E[Ak(j) j gs = gs;k = k];
which is unambiguously type k's expected payo given the history gs (and k). Clearly,
for s = 0, ak
s(gs) is always well dened: ak
0(g0) = E[Ak(j) j k = k] = ak. More generally,
26assume inductively that ak
s(gs) is well dened, i.e., assume that P[gs = gs j k = k] > 0.
If s = 2t   1 is odd, then gs+1 = (gs;m2
t), so P[gs+1 = gs+1 j k = k] > 0 when P[m2
t =
m2
t j gs = gs] > 0, which implies that ak
s+1(gs+1) remains well dened. If s = 2t is even,
then we may have a problem to dene ak
s+1(gs+1) because now it is player 1's message
that is added to the history: gs+1 = (gs;m1
t+1). Indeed, we may have P[m1
t+1 = m1
t+1 j
gs = gs;k = k] = k
t+1(m1
t+1 j ht) = 0 (even when P[m1
t+1 = m1
t+1 j gs = gs] > 0), so





First, notice that the equilibrium condition of player 1 implies ak
s(gs) = ak
s+1(gs;m) for all
m such that k
t+1(m j gs) > 0. Second notice that we will have the same problem in all
histories following (gs;m1
t+1) (they have probability 0 conditional on k), so we x more
generally k's payo for all these histories: ak
s+l(gs;m1
t+1;:::) = ak
s(gs); l = 1;2:::. All
this construction can be summarized formally as follows. For each s = 0;:::;N and k 2 K
dene the random variable fk
s as the longest subhistory of gs satisfying P[fk
s j k = k] > 0
(notice that this history necessarily ends with player 2's message, or is equal to gs), and
let
ak
s = E[Ak(j) j fk
s;k = k]:











where r is a random variable (stopping time) which is equal to the largest r such that
pk
r > 0.
Lemma 3 For every k 2 K, the sequence (ak





s for all even s;
(iii) If pk
N > 0, then ak
N = Ak(y), with y 2 Y (pN).
Proof. To prove the martingale property we must show that E[ak
s+1 j gs] = ak
s, for all
s = 0;1;:::;N. If pk




r, where r  s is the largest number such that pk
r > 0. Now, consider
27the case pk
s+1 > 0, and let s = 2t 1 be odd (when s is even, the martingale property will
follow from (ii)). Thus, pk






s+1 = E[Ak(j) j gs;m2
t;k = k]
ak
s = E[Ak(j) j gs;k = k]:
So,
E[ak




t = m j gs]E[Ak(j) j gs;m2





t = m j gs;k = k]E[Ak(j) j gs;m2
t = m;k = k]
= E[Ak(j) j gs;k = k] = ak
s;
the second equality following from the fact that m2
t and k are independent conditional
on gs. This proves the martingale property for all odd s. Property (i) is immediate:
ak
0 = E[Ak(j) j k = k] = ak by the denition of ak. To prove (ii) let s = 2t be even,
so gs+1 = (gs;m1
t+1). As before, when pk




r, with r  s. When pk
s+1 > 0, then pk






s+1 = E[Ak(j) j gs;m1
t+1;k = k]
ak
s = E[Ak(j) j gs;k = k]:
In such a situation these two terms are equal by the equilibrium condition of player 1 since
every message m1
t+1 player 1 of type k sends with strictly positive probability given gs







t+1 = m j gs;k = k]E[Ak(j) j gs;m1
t+1 = m;k = k]
= E[Ak(j) j gs;m1




Finally, to prove (iii), assume that pk
N > 0, so
ak
N = E[Ak(j) j gN;k = k] = E[Ak(j) j gN]
= Ak(n+1(gN)) = Ak(y); with y = n+1(gN) 2 Y (pN);
the second equality following from the fact that j and k are independent conditional on
28gN, and the last from the equilibrium condition of player 2.
Lemma 4 For every s = 0;1;:::;N we have as 2 INTIRsupp[ps].
Proof. Let us x a history gs such that P[gs = gs] > 0 and let supp[ps]  K, supp[ps] 6= ;,
be the set of types with a strictly positive posterior probability: pk
s = P[k = k j gs =
gs] > 0 for all k 2 supp[ps]. We must show that there exists y 2 (J) such that
E[Ak(j) j gs = gs;k = k]  Ak(y); for all k 2 supp[ps]:
Player 1's equilibrium condition implies (in particular) that, whatever his type k 2 supp[ps],
if he sends the same message m 2
T
k2K M(k) in all upcoming periods t0  t (where
t = (s + 2)=2 if s is even, and t = (s + 3)=2 if s is odd), then his expected payo in the
current period (s=2 if s is even, and (s + 1)=2 if s is odd) is not increased, so
E[Ak(j) j gs = gs;k = k]  E[Ak(j) j gs = gs;m1
t0 = m 8 t0  t;k = k]; for all k 2 supp[ps]:
The right hand side only depends on player 2's strategy and is thus well dened. As a
consequence, given gs = gs and m1
t0 = m 8 t0  t, which species the sequence of all
player 1's messages in the talking phase, j and k are independent. This implies
E
h
Ak(j) j gs = gs;m1




Ak(j) j gs = gs;m1





n+1(gN) j gs = gs;m1
t0 = m 8 t0  t

:
(Remember that we have extended linearly Ak to mixed actions.) Hence, by letting
y = E

n+1(gN) j gs = gs;m1
t0 = m 8 t0  t

;
which does not depend on k (it only depends on gs and m), we have completed the proof
of the lemma.
As we have already mentioned, (ps)s=0;1;:::;N and (s)s=0;1;:::;N have all the properties
required by Theorem 2 by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the
sequence (as)s=0;1;:::;N also satises all the properties of the theorem. This completes the
proof of the \only if" part of Theorem 2.
296.2 From constrained dimartingale to equilibrium: HB(p)  EB(p)
Let z = (z0;z1;:::;zN) be a martingale over some probability space (F;F;) and (nite)
sub -elds (Ft)t=1;:::;N, satisfying the properties of Theorem 2, with pk > 0 for all k 2 K,
and N = n. We construct a Nash equilibrium (;) of the n-stage communication game
 n(p) with expected payos (a;). First, for convenience we dene the martingale z on
the nodes of a probability tree. We introduce a set W with K + 1 elements, write F as
WN, and the atoms of Ft as elements gt of Wt. We thus describe the martingale z as
z = (zt(gt))t=0;1;:::;n;
where for each t = 0;1;:::;n, gt 2 Wt, and




for all gt 2 Wt satisfying (gt) > 0 (this is the martingale property). Notice that this
implies E[zt] = E[zt(gt)] =
P
gt2W t (gt)zt(gt) = z0, t = 0;1;:::;n. The properties of
the martingale in Theorem 2 can be restated as follows:
(D1) z0(g0) = z0 = (a;;p).
(D2) If (gn) > 0, then (an(gn);n(gn)) 2 E(pn(gn)).
(D3) at+1(gt+1) = at(gt) for all even t and pt+1(gt+1) = pt(gt) for all odd t, if (gt+1) > 0.
The interim individual rationality conditions for player 1 are restated as: for all t =
0;1;:::;n, if (gt) > 0, then at(gt) 2 INTIRsupp[pt(gt)].
In odd periods t, wt is associated to a message m1
t 2 M1 of player 1 (player 2's message
does not aect players' decisions at these periods), and in even periods t, wt is directly
associated to a jointly controlled lottery (possibly a series of jointly controlled lotteries),
which is not explicitly formalized here.12 Therefore, a history of messages hn consists,
with some abuse of notation, in a message m1
t 2 M1 of player 1 in each odd period t, and
in a realization wt 2 W of one or several jointly controlled lotteries in each even period t.
Accordingly, in the remaining of the proof we only construct explicitly player 1's strategy
k
t+1, k 2 K, when t is even, and player 2's strategy in the action phase, n+1. The set of
12The technique is standard; see, e.g., Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Aumann and Hart (2003). Note
that irrational probabilities might lead to innitely many jointly controlled lotteries (see Subsection 7.2).
For simplicity, the reader may simply consider wt as a signal publicly observed in even periods.





(M1  W)t=2 if t is even;
(M1  W)(t 1)=2  W if t is odd:
To each sequence gt = (w1;:::;wt) 2 Wt we associate a history t(gt) 2 Mt, with
t(gt) 6= t(g0
t) whenever gt 6= g0
t, as follows:
t(gt) = t(w1;w2;w3;w4 :::;wt)
= (m1(w1);w2;m3(g3);w4;:::);
where gr = (w1;:::;wr), r < t, is a subsequence of gt, and for all odd t, mt(gt) 2 M1,
mt(gt 1;wt) 6= mt(gt 1;w0
t) whenever wt 6= w0
t, and
M 1(mt(gt)) = supp[pt(gt)]:
Player 1's strategy . For each even period t = 0;2;4;:::, each sequence gt 2 Wt with
strictly positive probability and each type k 2 supp[pt(gt)] we construct player 1's local
strategy k
t+1(t(gt)). For each w 2 supp[( j gt)], dene
k







t+1(m j t(gt)) = 0 if m 6= mt+1(gt;w) for all w 2 W.
Player 2's strategy . We construct the local strategy n+1(hn) of player 2 for each nal
history of talk hn 2 Mn, with and without strictly positive probability (players' strategies
in the talking phase are irrelevant o the equilibrium path, but player 2's strategy in the
action phase is very important even after 0-probability histories).
If (gn) > 0 for gn 2 Wn, then by the second property of the martingale assumed in
the theorem, (an(gn);n(gn)) 2 E(pn(gn)), so we can dene,











If (gn) = 0 for gn 2 Wn, then consider the shortest subsequence gt = (w1;w2;:::;wt)
31of gn = (w1;w2;:::;wn) (note: t may be 0) such that (gt) > 0 and dene
n+1(n(gn)) = y such that ak
t(gt)  Ak(y) for all k 2 supp[pt(gt)]:
This is possible by the individual rationality conditions of the martingale.
The strategy prole (;) of the communication game  n(p) is now completely dened
(except, as explained above, for the JCL). We next check that it generates the appropriate
expected payos and that it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of  n(p). Let P = P;;p be
the probability distribution on 
 = KMnJ induced by (;) and p, and let E = E;;p
be the corresponding expectation operator.13
Lemma 5 For all t = 0;1;:::;n and gt 2 Wt we have:
(i) P[ht = t(gt)] = (gt);
(ii) P[k = k j ht = t(gt)] = pk
t(gt) for all k 2 K, (gt) > 0.
Proof. By induction on t. For t = 0 property (ii) is immediate: P[k = k] = pk = pk
0(g0).
For t = 1:
(i) We have:
P[h1 = 1(g1)] =
X
k2K





















P[k = k j h1 = 1(g1)] =




















Now assume that properties (i) and (ii) are satised at t, and let us check them at
t + 1. We distinguish two cases: (a) t is odd, i.e., a JCL is added in t + 1; (b) t is
13Since JCL are not formalized, P and E also depend on  for the realizations wt 2 W of JCL (public
signals) in even periods.
32even, i.e., player 1's signal is added in t + 1. Case (a) is simpler because we can exploit
the fact that the JCL does not depend on k. In the rest of the proof of the lemma, let
gt+1 = (gt;wt+1) 2 Wt+1.
(a) (i) Since t + 1 is even we have:
P[ht+1 = t+1(gt+1)] = P[ht+1 = (t(gt);wt+1)]
= P[ht = t(gt)]P[ht+1 = (t(gt);wt+1) j ht = t(gt)]
= (gt)(wt+1 j gt); by property (i) at t
= (gt;wt+1) = (gt+1):
(a) (ii) Since t + 1 is even we have:
P[k = k j ht+1 = t+1(gt+1)] = P[k = k j ht+1 = (t(gt);wt+1)]
= P[k = k j ht = t(gt)] because wt+1 and k are independent
= pk
t(gt) by property (ii) at t
= pk
t+1(gt+1) by the third property of the martingale.
(b) (i) Since t + 1 is odd we have:
P[ht+1 = t+1(gt+1)] = P[ht+1 = (t(gt);mt+1(gt+1)]
= P[ht = t(gt)]P[ht+1 = (t(gt);mt+1(gt+1)) j ht = t(gt)]





















= (gt)(wt+1 j gt) = (gt;wt+1) = (gt+1):
33(b) (ii) Since t + 1 is odd we have:
P[k = k j ht+1 = t+1(gt+1)] =
P[ht+1 = t+1(gt+1) j k = k]P[k = k]
P[ht+1 = t+1(gt+1)]
=
P[ht+1 = t+1(gt+1) j ht = t(gt);k = k]P[ht = t(gt) j k = k]P[k = k]
P[ht+1 = t+1(gt+1)]
=




t+1(mt+1(gt+1) j t(gt))P[ht = t(gt)]P[k = k j ht = t(gt)]
(gt+1)
;
the last but one equality following from property (i) at t+1, which has been checked just
before. By properties (i) and (ii) at t this yields:















This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6 We have:
(i) E[Ak(j) j k = k] = ak for all k 2 K;
(ii) E[Bk(j)] = .
Proof. (i) We show by induction on t (starting from t = n) that, for t = 0;1;:::;n,
ak
t(gt) = E[Ak(j) j ht = t(gt);k = k]; 8 k 2 supp[pt(gt)]: (1)
In particular, for t = 0, this will lead to what we are required to prove:
ak = ak
0(g0) = E[Ak(j) j h0 = 0(g0);k = k] = E[Ak(j) j k = k]:
Let t = n. If k 2 supp[pn(gn)], then, by the construction of player 2's strategy,
ak
n(gn) = Ak(n+1(n(gn)))
= E[Ak(j) j hn = n(gn);k = k];
so property (1) is satised for t = n. Now assume that the property is satised at t + 1







We distinguish two cases: when t is odd and when t is even.
If t is odd. Then, pt+1(gt;w) = pt(gt) for all w 2 supp[( j gt)], which implies
supp[pt+1(gt;w)] = supp[pt(gt)], so k 2 supp[pt+1(gt;w)] for all w 2 supp[( j gt)]. There-
fore, by the induction hypothesis, for all w 2 supp[( j gt)] we have
ak














P[ht+1 = (t(gt);w) j ht = t(gt);k = k] E[Ak(j) j ht+1 = t+1(gt;w);k = k]
= E[Ak(j) j ht = t(gt);k = k]:
If t is even. Then, ak
t+1(gt;w) = ak
t(gt) for all w 2 supp[( j gt)], which implies, by
the induction hypothesis,
ak
t(gt) = E[Ak(j) j ht+1 = t+1(gt;w);k = k];
for all w such that pk
t+1(gt;w) > 0. Hence, ak
t(gt) is also equal to any average of the
previous value, so we get property (1) at t.












































(gn)n(gn); by the construction of player 2's strategy
= E[n] = 0 = :
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7 The strategy  of player 2 is a best reply to the strategy  of player 1 in the
n-stage communication game  n(p).
Proof. Since n+1(n(gn)) 2 Y (pn(gn)) for (gn) > 0 it suces to check that pk
n(gn) =
P[k = k j hn = n(gn)] for all k 2 K. This as been proved in Lemma 5 (property (ii) with
t = n).
Lemma 8 The strategy  of player 1 is a best reply to the strategy  of player 2 in the
n-stage communication game  n(p).
Proof. Fix t even, gt such that (gt) > 0 and w such that (w j gt) > 0. Assume that
player 1's type k is such that pk
t(gt) > 0. The strategy  prescribes to send message
mt+1(gt;w) with probability k
t+1(mt+1(gt;w) j t(gt)) > 0 and any message which is not
of the form mt+1(gt;w) with probability 0. By construction, player 1 of type k is not able
to send a message m of the form mt+1(gt;w0) with pk
t+1(gt;w0) = 0, namely a message m
that is sent along the equilibrium path but is not sent by type k. Furthermore, by the
interim individually rational condition, player 1 cannot prot from sending a message m
o the equilibrium path, namely a message m not of the form mt+1(gt;w0). Finally, if
from stage t + 2 on, player 1 follows the prescribed strategy , he cannot gain at stage
36t + 1 by sending mt+1(gt;w) with a probability dierent from k
t+1(mt+1(gt;w) j t(gt)).
Indeed, by the dimartingale property (D3) on page 30 and property (1) on page 34, he is
indierent between all the allowed messages. Hence, by an induction argument, player 1
cannot gain by manipulating the probabilities of allowed messages.
By Lemmas 6, 7 and 8, we have constructed the appropriate strategy prole. This
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
7 Discussion and Extensions
7.1 Mediated Persuasion
In this paper we assumed that communication between the expert and the decisionmaker
takes place face-to-face. This excludes correlated extraneous signals and private recom-
mendations. In particular, there is no uncertainty on the messages received by each party
during the talking phase. If a mediator were available and if any form of costless commu-
nication were possible between the players, then the resulting set of equilibrium outcomes
would be the set of certication equilibrium outcomes introduced by Forges and Koessler
(2005). Under the assumption of full certiability made it the current paper, a single stage
of mediated certication is sucient and the set of certication equilibrium outcomes has
a canonical representation characterized by a transition probability  : K ! (J) and a
punishment strategy y 2 (J) satisfying the informational incentive constraint
Ak(( j k)) 
X
j2J
(j j k)Ak(j)  Ak(y) for all k 2 K, (2)














Pr(k j j)Bk(j) 
X
k2K
Pr(k j j)Bk(j0); 8 j 2 supp[]; j0 2 J:
(3)
(The proof of this claim can be found in Forges and Koessler, 2005). Let EM(p)  RK R
be the resulting set of mediated certication equilibrium payos. This set includes the
set of equilibrium payos achieved with face-to-face communication, so E(p)  ES(p) 
EB(p)  EM(p), and all these inclusions may be strict.
The set of communication equilibrium outcomes (Myerson, 1982; Forges, 1986) is char-
37acterized by recommendations satisfying (3) and (4):
X
j2J
(j j k)Ak(j) 
X
j2J
(j j k0)Ak(j) for all k, k0 2 K. (4)
Since condition (4) is a stronger requirement than (2), the set of certication equilibrium
outcomes also includes the set of communication equilibrium outcomes.
The analysis is much more tractable when a mediator is available to help the players
to communicate and to certify their information.14 For example, the equilibrium outcome
with three talking stages of the introductory example (see Figure 3 on page 8) can easily
be implemented with the help of a mediator as follows. First, player 1 chooses whether to
make a certiable report to the mediator concerning the true state of the world. When
there are only two types, player 1 has two possible reports in every state k: either he
certies his information by sending message ck or he certies nothing. Afterwards, the
mediator gives a (random) recommendation of action to player 2 conditionally on the
report of player 1. Denote respectively by (j j k) and y(j) the probabilities that the
mediator recommends action j to player 2 when player 1 sends message ck and m 6= c1; c2,
respectively. The following recommendations mimic the equilibrium outcome:
(j4 j k1) = (j5 j k1) = 3=8 (j2 j k1) = 1=4
(j1 j k2) = (j4 j k2) = 1=8 (j2 j k2) = 3=4
y(j3) = 1:
If player 1 completely certies his information and player 2 follows the recommendation
of the mediator, then no player has an incentive to deviate. Indeed, player 1 never deviates
since by certifying his information his payo is always strictly positive, whereas by not
certifying his information his payo would be zero. From Bayes' rule, player 2's beliefs
about the state of Nature given the recommendations of the mediator are Pr(k1 j j5) = 1,
Pr(k1 j j4) = 3=4, Pr(k1 j j2) = 1=4 and Pr(k1 j j1) = 0, so the recommendations are
optimal for him given his beliefs.
7.2 Persuasion without a Deadline
Throughout this paper, we assumed that an arbitrarily large maximum number of commu-
nication stages was xed in advance, namely that players were constrained by a deadline.
14In particular, certication equilibrium outcomes can be characterized in a canonical way for Bayesian
games with any number of players, any information structure, and any assumption on certiability possi-
bilities.
38In the case of cheap talk, Forges (1984, 1990a) shows that new equilibrium outcomes can
be reached if no deadline is imposed to the (almost surely nite) players' conversations,
namely if the length of this conversation is endogenously determined by the equilibrium
strategies. The same phenomenon obviously occurs in the more general model of this paper
and our results are easily adapted so as to cover almost surely nite, long persuasion with-
out a deadline. One simply has to consider dimartingales which converge almost surely
in a nite, but not uniformly bounded, number of stages. Aumann and Hart (2003) go
further by considering any dimartingales, in particular those which do not almost surely
converge in nitely many stages. In Aumann and Hart's (2003) model, time has order
!+1; that is, there is an innite sequence of time periods, with an additional period after
the whole sequence. This approach, which entails conceptual and technical diculties
(see Aumann and Hart, 2003, Sections 4.2 and 8), is not, at least today, sustained by
any game-theoretical example (see however Aumann and Hart, 1986, for a mathematical
example). In the cheap talk case, Krishna (2005) provides sucient conditions for the set
of equilibrium payos from innite conversations to be the same as the set of equilibrium
payos from conversations which are nite with probability one.
7.3 Sequential Rationality
It is well known that in usual (one-shot, unilateral) cheap talk games, standard equi-
librium renements do not eliminate any Nash equilibrium outcome. In particular, the
non-revealing equilibrium outcome is always a sequential equilibrium outcome. In long
cheap talk games, we are not aware of any example with a Nash equilibrium outcome that
cannot be sustained by sequentially rational strategies. But the characterization of the set
of sequential equilibrium payos in long cheap talk games is still an open problem.
When information is certiable, it is very easy to construct games where the set of se-
quential equilibrium outcomes is strictly included in the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
For instance, player 2 is not sequentially rational o the equilibrium path when player 1
fully certies his type in the non-revealing equilibrium of the introductory example for
p 2 (2=5;3=5), in the second partially revealing equilibrium (PRE2) of the introductory
example for p 2 (0;3=5), in the non-revealing equilibrium of Example 1 in the appendix
for p 2 (0;1), and in the non-revealing equilibrium of Example 2 in the appendix for
p 2 (0;2=3). Likewise, in Example 3 in the appendix, if we add a third action (a worst
outcome) yielding a negative payo to both players in both states, then there would be
a fully revealing Nash equilibrium payo which cannot be sustained by any sequentially
rational strategy for player 2.
39If we want player 2's strategy to be sequentially rational in the action phase, then
we have to strengthen player 1's interim individual rationality condition. That is, the
punishment strategy which is used by player 2 o the equilibrium path must be optimal
for player 2 for at least one belief over K consistent with the history of certicates sent by
player 1. More precisely, in our geometric characterizations, we should replace INTIRL by
INTIR
L  fa 2 RK : 8 M  L; 9 pM 2 (M) and yM 2 Y (pM); ak  Ak(yM) 8 k 2 Mg:
Notice that subgame perfection is obtained as a special case when events M in the
previous equation are reduced to singletons. It is also interesting to remark that with this
modication, the set of equilibrium payos that we obtain does not include, in general,
Aumann and Hart's (2003) set anymore. For example, as we noticed above, non-revealing
equilibrium payos do not always belong to the former set.
7.4 Partial Certiability
As we noticed in Footnote 6, our results do not require that all events are certiable
with a single message when multiple stages of communication are allowed. However, if
the condition of the message correspondence M in Footnote 6 is not satised, partial
certiability may signicantly complicate the analysis and restrict the set of equilibrium
outcomes. This is true even in long persuasion games in which every single type is fully
certiable. For example, in the silent game of Figure 9, the equilibrium payo ((0;1;1);1) 2
ES(p) can be obtained in the persuasion game when player 1 certies that his type belongs
to fk2;k3g, but is not an equilibrium payo of the persuasion game if there is no message
m such that M 1(m) = fk2;k3g. The general geometric characterization of equilibrium






40A Appendix: Simple Examples
Example 1 (Full revelation without certication) In the silent game of Figure 10,
the non-revealing equilibria are
Y (p) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
fj1g if p > 3=4;
fj2g if p < 3=4;
(J) if p = 3=4:
The corresponding interim individually rational equilibrium payos of the expert are
represented by Figure 11 in solid lines. They coincide with Aumann and Hart's (2003)
modied non-revealing equilibrium payos, so a fully revealing equilibrium (FRE) exists
in the communication game whether or not the expert's types are certiable.
j1 j2
k1 1;1 0;0 p
k2 0;0 3;3 (1   p)

















Figure 11: Modied and interim individually rational non-revealing equilibrium payos of
the expert in Example 1.
Example 2 (Full revelation with certication) In the silent game of Figure 12, the
expert always wants the decisionmaker to choose the same action whatever his type. The
41interim individually rational non-revealing equilibrium payos of the expert are represented
by Figure 13 in solid and dashed lines. Here, information transmission is not possible with
cheap talk only (the solid lines never intercept), while a FRE exists when the expert's
types are certiable.
j1 j2
k1 3;2 1;0 p
k2 3;0 1;4 (1   p)
Figure 12: Silent game of Example 2.
















Figure 13: Modied (solid lines) and interim individually rational (solid and dashed lines)
non-revealing equilibrium payos of the expert in Example 2.
Example 3 (No revelation) In the silent game of Figure 14, cheap talk and information
certication cannot matter. The optimal actions of the decisionmaker are the same as in
Example 2. The corresponding interim individually rational non-revealing equilibrium
payos of the expert are represented by Figure 15 in solid lines. The dotted lines do not
belong to the set of interim individually rational payos, so the persuasion game does not
admit a fully revealing equilibrium.
Example 4 (Partial revelation without certication) In the silent game of Figure 16,
the interim individually rational non-revealing equilibrium payos of the expert are rep-
42j1 j2
k1 3;2 4;0 p
k2 3;0 1;4 (1   p)
Figure 14: Silent game of Example 3.















Figure 15: Modied and interim individually rational non-revealing equilibrium payos of
the expert (solid lines) in Example 3.
resented by Figure 17 in solid lines. As in Example 3, this game does not admit a fully
revealing equilibrium (the dotted lines are not interim individually rational), but it has a
partially revealing equilibrium for p 2 (3=10;4=5).
43j1 j2 j3 j4
k1 4;0 2;7 5;9 1;10 p
k2 1;10 4;7 4;4 2;0 1   p
Figure 16: Silent game of Example 4.




















Figure 17: Modied and interim individually rational non-revealing equilibrium payos of
the expert (solid lines) in Example 4.
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